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Claims for broken promises

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Claims for work performed and unfulfilled promises

If you have performed work or services for someone on the understanding that you would receive something in their will, or they promised to leave you something, and you have not been left what you expected, you may be able to make one or more of the following claims against their estate:

  • Breach of contract – If you had a legally binding contract with the deceased, that contract can usually be enforced against their estate. Read about recovering a debt owed by someone who has died here.

  • Testamentary Promises Act – If you performed work or services for the deceased having been led to believe that you would be provided for in their will, you may be able to claim against their estate under the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act. Read about Testamentary Promises Act claims here.

  • Constructive trust – If you contributed to the deceased’s property (either financially or through sweat equity) and had a reasonable expectation of gaining an interest in the property, you may have a claim pursuant to a constructive trust. Read about constructive trust claims here.

  • Promissory estoppel – If the deceased represented to you that you would gain an interest in their property, and you relied on that representation to your detriment, you may have a promissory estoppel claim. Read about promissory estoppel claims here.

  • Quantum meruit – If you performed services for the deceased having made it clear that you expected payment for those services, and the deceased freely accepted the services, you may have a claim pursuant to the doctrine of quantum meruit. Read about quantum meruit claims here.

Testamentary Promises Act claims

If you performed work or services for the deceased having been led to believe that you would be provided for in their will, you may be able to claim against their estate under the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act. 

Claimants may include, for example:

  • a child who was led to believe that he or she would inherit the family farm if they worked on it during their lifetime;

  • a carer who continued working for the deceased for very little payment on the understanding that they would be provided for in the deceased’s will; or

  • a person who gave personal or financial assistance to the deceased on the basis that they would be looked after when the deceased died. 

There are no restrictions on who can claim under the Testamentary Promises Act.

If the person claiming is a close family member of the deceased, they may also be able to make a claim under the Family Protection Act. Read more about the Family Protection Act here

What do I need to prove to succeed in a Testamentary Promises Act claim?

In order to succeed in a claim under the Testamentary Promises Act, you will need to prove that:

  1. You provided services to, or undertook work for, the deceased;

  2. The deceased promised (expressly or impliedly) that they would reward you in their will;

  3. There is a sufficient link between the services and the promise (ie the promise was to reward the services); and

  4. The deceased failed to make the promised provision or otherwise reward you.

Each requirement is explained in more detail below.

1.  Work or services performed

The Court takes a broad view of what constitutes “work” and “services”.

Work includes employment acts, such as the provision of business services, caregiving, farming, or housekeeping.

Services encompasses things done for the deceased, as well as companionship, affection and emotional support. This is particularly the case if the deceased was elderly, lonely or in poor health. Agreeing not to do something can also constitute a service.

In past cases, the court has recognised various actions as amounting to services. This has included: postponing marriage at the request of the deceased, giving up employment, co-habitation, emotional support and, in some circumstances, mere companionship and affection. Simply because what was rendered to a deceased person was intangible and of a value incapable of precise monetary assessment will not prevent it from being considered a service.

Services within a family context will only qualify if they go beyond what is normally to be expected within the relationship. For friendship, companionship, affection and emotional support to qualify as services, there must be “something extra” – it must exceed “what is normally to be expected of a relative, a member of the same household, a neighbour or a friend” to constitute a service.

2.  Promise by the deceased

A “promise” includes “any statement or representation of fact or intention”. The promise must be to reward the claimant on the deceased’s death rather than during the deceased’s lifetime. The promise can be express or implied. It includes a statement or representation of present fact (“I have done X for you in my will”) or intention (“I will do X for you in my will”).

The courts have been prepared to interpret even very imprecise statements as promissory in order to grant relief where a reasonably plain case has been made out. In the case of Re William (deceased) HC Wellington CP 866/92, 21 July 1994, the Court held that statements such as “you’ll be right” were sufficient to amount to a promise to reward the services carried out.

3.  Link between services and promise

The promise must, either expressly or impliedly, be at least partly one to reward the claimant for services rendered or work done by making some provision for the claimant in the deceased’s will. A mere promise to make provision which is not linked with, or founded upon, such services or work is insufficient. It does not matter whether the services were rendered or the work was performed before or after the promise was made.

Even where there is no express connection between the promise and the service (ie “if you do X, I will leave you Y in my will”), the Court is sometimes prepared to infer a nexus from the surrounding circumstances where the promise and the services took place contemporaneously.

It is the reason for the making of the promise, and not the reason for the providing of the services, that is relevant. The fact that the provision of the services was motivated by love and affection is irrelevant.

4.  Failure to fulfil promise

In determining whether the deceased has fulfilled the promise, the Court will assess what was promised against the benefits derived by the claimant under the deceased’s will and during the deceased’s life. This is referred to as a “netting off” exercise. Only if there is an imbalance will the claim succeed. And even then, the greatest amount that can be claimed is the amount of the imbalance.

What will I get if my Testamentary Promises Act claim is successful? 

If your claim under the Act is successful, the Court has a broad discretion when it comes to deciding what award to make. Importantly, even if you are successful, you are not automatically entitled to receive the thing or amount that you were promised. 

In determining what amount to award, the Court will take into account:

  • all the circumstances, including, in particular, the circumstances in which the promise was made and the services were rendered or the work was performed;

  • the value of the services or work;

  • the value of the thing promised; 

  • the value of the estate; and

  • the nature and amount of the claims of other persons on the estate. 

If the services you provided were considerable, and the property promised was a central feature of your life or the services you provided, it is possible that you could receive the property that was promised to you. This is provided, however, that it would not cause injustice to others who have an interest in the estate. 

Even where a specific item of property had been promised, something less may be awarded to you if the services you provided were of little value or if there is some other factor at play. 

The most important overall consideration is what amount is most reasonable for you to be awarded in all the circumstances. When both parties have received benefits from each other, the court will compare those benefits and compensate you only for the unremunerated balance. The court will never award more than the value of the thing that was promised to you. 

What time limits apply to Testamentary Promises Act claims?

Any claim under the Testamentary Promises Act must be filed in the court within 12 months from the date that probate is granted. The court can extend this timeframe, but not if the estate has already been distributed. Any distributions that have already been made cannot usually be brought back into the estate to meet a claim.

How do I make a Testamentary Promises Act claim?

A claim under the Testamentary Promises Act can be made in either the Family Court or the High Court. If the claim relates to Māori freehold land, it will instead need to be brought in the Māori Land Court. Preparing and filing a claim is not a simple process, so it is prudent to engage a lawyer to help you.  

If you intend also to bring a claim for breach of contract, quantum meruit or estoppel, the claim will need to be filed in the High Court, as the Family Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear these claims. 

Examples of previous Testamentary Promises Act claims

Hill v Waddingham [2019] NZHC 3505

The deceased, Neville, farmed a property in Southland. The claimant, Emily, met Neville in 1980. Throughout their 36-year friendship, Emily would regularly travel from her home in Invercargill and work with Neville on his farm. Three years before his death, Neville told Emily that, in return, “there would be something in [his will] for her”. Neville left Emily $100,000 out of an estate worth around $6 million. Emily claimed that the $100,000 did not reasonably compensate her for the work and services she provided to Neville. She brought a claim under the Testamentary Promises Act seeking additional $400,000. 

The Court accepted that there had been a promise, that services had been performed, and that there was a link between the promise and the services. The key question was whether the promise had been fulfilled. (Although it is not discussed in the judgment, the Court must have regarded the promise as being to leave Emily something sufficient to compensate her for the services that she had performed, as there was no dispute that she had been left “something” under the will, which is what she had, in literal terms, been promised.) 

Having regard to the significant unpaid work, domestic help and companionship that Emily had provided for Neville, the Court held that the gift of $100,000 was insufficient. It made no difference that the deceased was a particularly frugal person who would have regarded that amount as a significant sum. The Court awarded Emily an additional $350,000.

McMillan v Pretty [2019] NZHC 1094

A nephew loaned $185,000 to his aunt interest-free to enable her to renovate her property on the basis of a promise that he would inherit the property after she and her husband died. Shortly after making the promise, the aunt made a new will leaving the property to the nephew, as she had said she would. When further funds were required to complete the renovations, the aunt again went to the nephew asking for money. The nephew was reluctant to lend further funds and the relationship broke down. Shortly thereafter, the aunt made a new will leaving the property to another family member and recording the funds owed to the nephew as a mere debt due.

The nephew brought a claim against the aunt’s estate seeking the property, which was by the time of the trial worth $1.4 million. The Court accepted that a testamentary promise had been made and not kept. Having regard to the position of the beneficiary of the estate, who was not wealthy, the Court awarded the claimant 75% of the value of the property. 

Annett v Nurmela [2018] NZHC 2841

The deceased, Andy, and the claimant, Pauline, had been friends for many years when Andy was badly injured in a car accident. Pauline provided Andy with intensive support for around seven months. Pauline helped Andy as he progressed from two crutches to one. She organised and got him to a variety of appointments to see doctors, specialists, associated xray/scan appointments, the bank, lawyers and building supply premises. She also regularly made and delivered meals to him. 

In return, Andy promised his home to Pauline on three occasions. While the promises were made freely, the Court regarded it as significant that Andy had made the promises at a time when he was recovering from his accident and in a position of vulnerability. The property comprised Andy’s entire estate and was worth around $1.4 million. Under his will, Andy had left the property to his brother, with whom Andy had little contact but was not estranged. 

Pauline brought a claim seeking 90 percent of the estate. The Family Court upheld the claim under the Testamentary Promises Act, but only to the value of $25,000, by reference to the appropriate hourly rate for a caregiver working full time. The High Court increased the award to $75,000 having regard to the significance of the services to Andy in a time of need and in the context of his family isolation. 

Le Couteur v Norris [2018] NZCA 572

The deceased, Sidney, had three children. She was closest with her daughter, Juliet, who was the only one of her children who lived in the same city as her. 

During the later years of Sidney’s life, Juliet provided assistance to Sidney, including:

  • helping Sidney to care for her father until his death;

  • visiting Sidney regularly, having her to visit and stay overnight, and staying with Sidney when she was bedridden for a period;

  • including Sidney in Juliet’s “family life”, providing her with love and companionship, and with reassurance when she started suffering from memory loss;

  • helping Sidney around the house and garden, shopping for her, assisting her with business and banking dealings, and providing transport for her, including taking her to medical appointments; and

  • working only part-time in order to be available to support Sidney.

Sidney had also lived with Juliet for a couple of years before deciding to live independently again. Sidney moved out and purchased her own property, which she promised to leave to Juliet on her death. Sidney made a handwritten change to her will and prepared a note recording this promise. The note stated that the property was being left to Juliet “in appreciation for all her loving kindness to me always”.

As she got older, Sidney began to struggle with living independently, so she sold her house and she and Juliet bought adjoining properties in Parnell. Sidney told Juliet that she would inherit this new property on Sidney’s death, but she did not update her will to reflect this intention. Sidney became unwell, moved to hospital, and then died.  

The High Court held that Sidney had not specifically promised to leave the Parnell property to Juliet. The Court of Appeal reversed this finding, holding that the statement that Juliet would inherit the property on Sidney’s death was sufficient for the purposes of the Act. 

Somewhat surprisingly, the High Court considered that the support that Juliet had provided was no more than that which a loving daughter would provide. The Court of Appeal disagreed. It held that the services Juliet had provided far exceeded the normal services that a dutiful child might provide their aged parent, pointing out that Juliet’s efforts enabled her brothers to lead their own separate lives without them having to concern themselves with Sidney’s care.

The Court of Appeal held that, while family ties may have influenced Sidney’s desire to leave her property to Juliet, it was clear that Sidney was also moved to acknowledge what Juliet had done for her, thus creating a nexus between the services and the promise. This was evidenced by the note which Sidney had signed purporting to bequeath the earlier property to Juliet, the wording of which tied the intended gift to Juliet’s loving kindness (ie services) and confirmed that the gift was made for that purpose. The Court also referred to diary entries that Sidney had made recognising her obligation to Juliet for the services and support she had provided her. 

In deciding what amount Juliet should receive, the Court of Appeal had regard to the fact that the services were provided in the context of a strong mother/daughter relationship and that Juliet would also have enjoyed positive benefits from that relationship. The Court considered it relevant that Juliet would receive a one-third share of the balance of Sidney’s estate. Juliet was awarded an additional $590,000. 

Blumenthal v Stewart [2017] NZCA 181

Mr Blumenthal claimed against the estate of his late stepfather, Mr Steward, claiming that Mr Steward had promised to leave Mr Blumenthal his rural property. The Court of Appeal and High Court both dismissed Mr Blumenthal’s claim. The Court of Appeal found that Mr Blumenthal’s actions in helping his stepfather with the property, such as spraying weeds and maintaining the water pump, were no more than the norm in a close familial relationship such as the one shared by the men, and that the contributions made by Mr Blumenthal had already been offset by the benefits he received in having had the use of the property. The Court also held that there was nothing linking Mr Steward’s promise to the services that Mr Blumenthal provided, regarding it as more likely that it was Mr Steward’s close family relationship with Mr Blumenthal which motivated the promise, not the work that Mr Blumenthal had undertaken. 

Tawhai v Govorko [2015] NZHC 2874

Mr Robinson and Mr Tawhai were de facto partners. Mr Robinson was about 30 years older. He had dealt with serious illness for years and age exacerbated his health problems. When, aged 83, Mr Robinson sold his property and moved into Mr Tawhai’s home, Mr Tawhai became his full-time caregiver, and continued in this role until Mr Robinson’s death some nine years later. For this, Mr Tawhai was paid a small wage by WINZ as caregiver.

During his time as a full-time carer for Mr Robinson, Mr Tawhai fulfilled all of the household duties – cooking, cleaning, washing and mowing lawns – as well as caring for his partner’s personal needs, including liaising with lawyers and accountants, and ensuring that tax obligations were complied with. Mr Tawhai also had an integral role in managing the couple’s property investments, negotiating purchases, arranging mortgage advances and tenancies. 

The couple had a very busy social life and Mr Tawhai would accompany Mr Robinson to social engagements, and help him to participate in these with transport and helping him to converse, given his hearing difficulties. They regularly travelled together, and Mr Tawhai would assist Mr Robinson during these trips. Mr Robinson was adamant that he was not going into a rest home because they were “only for old people”.

Mr Robinson had told Mr Tawhai that he would “get the lot”, that he would “be a millionaire” and that he “had nothing to worry about”. He repeated these promises to Mr Tawhai in front of other people. In a will made at the time that he moved in with Mr Tawhai, Mr Robinson had left Mr Tawhai the majority of his estate. However, in later wills he progressively reduced Mr Tawhai’s entitlement. Mr Robinson’s final will left Mr Tawhai only around half of his estate. 

The Family Court held that the statements that Mr Robinson had made were insufficient to amount to a promise for the purposes of the Act. The Family Court Judge also held that there was nothing connecting the promise to the services, as Mr Tawhai would have made it clear that he was not motivated by the prospect of receiving Mr Robinson’s money. 

The High Court disagreed on both counts. It held that the clear inference from Mr Robinson’s statements was that he would make substantial testamentary provision for Mr Tawhai, and that this was a qualifying promise for the purposes of the Act.  The High Court held that Mr Tawhai’s motivation in providing the services (affection rather than a monetary incentive) was entirely irrelevant. 

The Court then considered what Mr Tawhai had received during their joint lives and under the operative will, “netting off” the benefits and burdens. The Court had regard to the parties’ overseas travel, the pooling of their financial resources into property and their lifestyle, the WINZ income that Mr Tawhai had received, and property which he had received from Mr Robinson by survivorship and under the will (in total around half of Mr Robinson’s estate). Taking this into account, the Court awarded Mr Tawhai a further $100,000 including legal costs. 

Powell v Public Trustee [2003] 1 NZLR 381 (CA)

Mr Birdling had promised to leave Mrs Powell his entire estate of $360,000. Mrs Powell worked at Mr Birdling’s home and farm and provided companionship and support over the decade before his death. The Court of Appeal found that Mrs Powell had “materially contributed to Mr Birdling’s ability to remain on the farm until his death”. Mrs Powell was awarded $120,000. 

Byrne v Bishop [2001] 3 NZLR 780 (CA)

The claimants had effectively adopted an elderly neighbour as a family member and provided him with 19 years of services. In an award going well beyond the normal range, even for a claim against a large estate, the claimants were awarded $1.4 million from an estate of $2.5 million.

Kite v May [2001] NZFLR 514 (HC)

The claimant worked as a housekeeper for the deceased and eventually became his de facto partner. In the years before he died the deceased was in very poor health and his partner supported him in ways that enabled him to avoid going into a resthome. She did the housekeeping, grocery and personal shopping, provided hospitality to friends and family, sexual intimacy and companionship. 

The Judge found that the services provided went above the norm: “…in the last two to three years of [the deceased’s] life, the services performed by [the claimant] could by no means be described as being merely of the “usual” kind which are incident on a relationship of that character. They went well beyond that, and enabled [the deceased] to live out his time at his beloved farm.” The claimant had been promised the provision of sufficient financial support to enable her to be financially independent, and a suitable house and car. She was awarded $200,000 out of an estate of $4 million. 

Re Berkett HC Christchurch M232/97, 2 November 1999

The claimant had provided services to the deceased for 20 years. Over the 10 years before he died, the claimant had provided services to the deceased akin to a caregiver. The claimant was awarded the full value of her claim: $220,000 from an estate of $1.1 million. 

Constructive trust claims

If you contributed to someone else’s property (either financially or through sweat equity), and you reasonably expected to gain an interest in the property in return, you may have a claim against the property pursuant to a constructive trust. 

To establish a constructive trust claim, you will need to demonstrate that:

  1. You contributed directly or indirectly to the acquisition, preservation or enhancement of the property in question;

  2. Your contribution to the property was more than minor and manifestly exceeded any benefits that you received from the arrangement;

  3. You reasonably expected to gain an interest in the property; and

  4. The deceased should reasonably expect to yield an interest to you (ie that in all the circumstances you should both reasonably be taken to have expected that you would share in the asset as a result of your contribution).

Relief by way of a constructive trust is not usually available in respect of assets that were not owed by the deceased at the time of their death. However, in certain circumstances, a constructive trust claim can be made against property that was owned by or has been transferred into a family trust. 

Promissory estoppel claims

If the deceased represented to you that you would gain an interest in their property, and you relied on that representation to your detriment, you may have a promissory estoppel claim.

In order to succeed in a promissory estoppel claim, you will need to show that:

  1. The deceased created or encouraged a belief or expectation by words or conduct;

  2. To the extent that you relied on any express representation, that representation was clear and unequivocal;

  3. You reasonably relied on the representation to your detriment; and

  4. It would be unconscionable for the deceased to depart from the belief or expectation.

Quantum meruit claims

Quantum meruit is a claim for reasonable compensation for services performed, where the amount to be paid was not agreed in advance. 

If the deceased promised during their lifetime to pay or do something for you in exchange for something you did for them, but they did not carry out their end of the deal, you may have a claim against their estate under the doctrine of quantum meruit. 

To establish a quantum meruit claim, you will usually need to demonstrate that:

  • the deceased asked you to provide services, or freely accepted services that you provided; and

  • the deceased knew or ought to have known that you expected to be reimbursed for those services.

If you succeed in a quantum meruit claim, you are entitled to be paid the reasonable cost of the services that you provided. In determining the reasonable cost of the services, the Court will consider the market value of the services, any agreed price, the benefit of the services to the deceased and the cost to you of providing the services. 

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